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Abstract
This paper evaluates cost efficiency and some of its managerial
determinants in Germany’s local public transport. A heteroscedastic
Stochastic Frontier approach reveals that a high degree of tramcar utilisation
and a high outsourcing degree influence the efficiency predictions positively.
Mean efficiencies lie between 0.849 and 0.952, depending on the applied
panel data models accounting for unobserved heterogeneity and observed
heterogeneous output variables for tram, light railway and metro services.
The inefficiency levels correspond to a savings potential between 1.40 and
4.43 bn EUR based on the 28.23 bn EUR total costs (in 2006 prices) for 254
observations of 39 companies 1997-2006.
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1.0 Introduction
As local monopolies public transport networks are a natural point of interest
for researchers conducting efficiency analysis. The results of such analyses can
be very useful for yardstick competition among the transportation companies.
However scientific benchmarking has not yet found its way into practical
regulation in Germany. Instead, competitive tendering, which is encouraged via
EU regulation 1370/2007, is used to provide incentives for efficient transport
services, but only in some regions. Hence the question is what conclusions
can be drawn from applying efficiency analysis to local public transport. Two
possibilities emerge: evaluation of market structure, and supporting strategic firm
decisions. This paper focuses on the second point, and evaluates cost efficiency
and some of its determinants for multi-output companies. Multi-output companies
are those which provide bus services and tram, light railway, and metro (in the
sense of underground) services - aggregated as rail-bound services.1
The ultimate challenge for the country’s local public transport is the very low
level of cost coverage across nearly all companies with a mean level of 73.8 per
cent (Verband Deutscher Verkehrsunternehmen, 2008). Parts of these losses may
be attributed to the reality that local public transport is a public service obligation
(Daseinsvorsorge). However, as public budgets are tighten, long-term losses may
not be sustainable.
This paper focuses on evaluating cost efficiency and some of the major
determinants with Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA). SFA is a parametric
benchmarking method which compares decision-making units relative to the
1 The companies in the data set used in this paper do not offer suburban (for example
S-Bahn) or regional railway services. The analysis is hence restricted to services based
on the German passenger transportation law (Personenbeförderungsgesetz, PBefG)
and the German Ordinance on the Construction and Operation of Rail Systems
for Light-Rail-Transit (Verordnung über den Bau und Betrieb der Straßenbahnen
(Straßenbahn-Bau- und Betriebsordnung - BOStrab)).
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best-practice peer. It does not assume as does neoclassical theory (Samuelson,
1983) that all players act optimally. I prefer SFA instead of Data Envelopment
Analysis (DEA), which in its basic implementation is deterministic and
non-parametric, mainly because of the applicability of panel data models with
SFA that incorporates the time horizon into the analysis. Furthermore, SFA is
useful because of the possible derivations from the deployment of a functional
form, for example, significance levels, and because it can handle data errors.2
Three SFA models are used in the following analysis because there is substantial
difference in how they manage for unobserved heterogeneity and observed
heterogeneous output characteristics. Additionally, the vehicle utilisation rate
and the outsourcing share are suspected to be determinants of efficiency which
are under management’s control. For these reasons the usual assumption of
independent and identically distributed inefficiencies may not be maintainable.
Since these managerial determinants are endogenous it may not be appropriate
to allow them to directly affect the mean of the inefficiency function, unlike the
treatment of exogenous variables in Battese and Coelli (1995). I therefore follow
the approach of Bhattacharyya et al (1995) and Hadri et al (2003b) who include
these managerial determinants as heteroscedastic variables in the inefficiency
function and then compare efficiency levels. The analysis is conducted on a unique
panel data set which has been implicitly collected for this research project and
represents the first of its kind for local public transport in Germany. It consists of
254 observations for 39 multi-output companies from 1997 until 2006.
Pioneering studies in stochastic efficiency analysis of multi-output local public
transport operators were carried out by Viton (1992, 1993), who evaluated
economies of scale and scope and benefits from organisational restructuring in
2 I am aware that the a priori assumption of a special functional form imposes some
restrictions on the analysis. See Greene (2008) for an in-depth introduction of the
econometric approach to efficiency analysis.
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the San Francisco Bay area. Viton applied a quadratic cost function to companies
with zero outputs for some of the considered outputs, motor bus, rapid or
commuter rail, streetcar, trolley-bus, demand-responsive, and other means of
public transport. The cost frontier was estimated based on a pooled data set from
1984 until 1986 following the model by Aigner et al (1977), who first introduced
the concept of SFA. Viton’s results support the formation of larger entities.
Bhattacharyya et al (1995) examined Indian bus operations, analysing the
determinants of cost inefficiency, which are under control of management. The
determinants are included as heteroscedastic components of the inefficiency
function. A translog variable cost function is estimated in a multi-step procedure
with firm- and time-specific effects exploring the data’s panel structure. The
results indicate that, under the threat of closure nationalised operators are the
most inefficient, followed by corporations with an independent administrative and
managerial structure and units that are operated by transportation departments
of state governments. As expected, the breakdown rate negatively influences
efficiency whereas the rate of vehicle utilisation positively influences efficiency
predictions.
Farsi et al (2006) compared cost efficiency predictions of several Stochastic
Frontier models and calculated economies of scale and density for regional
bus companies in Switzerland. They suggest that the True Random Effects
(TRE) model by Greene (2004, 2005b) could be used as a benchmark model for
regulation purposes, mainly because of its ability to differ between inefficiency
and unobserved heterogeneity.3 Conventional models, in particular a pooled
model fed with panel data, the applied Random Effects (RE) model (Pitt and
Lee, 1981) and the Fixed Effects model (Schmidt and Sickles, 1984), may give
inaccurate results.
3 However, the authors emphasise that a mechanical use transferring efficiency levels
into X-factors must be avoided.
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Farsi et al (2007) evaluated economies of scale and scope for a panel data sample
of Swiss operators. The three modes of transport, trolley-bus, motor-bus and
tramways, are captured by a quadratic cost function. The estimations are based
on a pooled heteroscedastic model with autoregressive errors. This econometric
framework relies on average functions. The authors find increasing returns to
scale across all modes of transport and economies of scope. This paper does
not consider economies of scale and scope. The interested reader may consult
Nieswand et al (2008) for bus operators and Walter (2009) for multi-output
companies in Germany.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides the
functional form with its specification as well as the econometric models. Section 3
describes the data in combination with the activity in the German local public
transport sector. Section 4 gives the results as well as their interpretation and
Section 5 concludes.
2.0 Methodology
2.1 Cost function
The application of a cost function requires the assumption of cost-minimising
behaviour with given input prices and output quantities (Coelli et al, 2005).
Transport economists have typically applied a cost function4 instead of a profit
function, probably also due to data constraints. Nowadays, it is more difficult to
determine whether local public transport companies in Germany minimise costs
or maximise profits because of the increasing policy demands for fewer subsidies.
The exogeneity of output quantities can be justified with the definiteness of the
4 See Berechman (1993) for an introduction.
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supplied area, typical for a local monopoly, and the requirement to supply, because
local transport is a public service obligation. In this case, a total cost (C) function
can be written as
C = f(Y,Q,wL, wK , ID,Dt) (1)
dependent on two outputs, the number of seat-kilometres for buses (Y ) and the
number of seat-kilometres in trams, light railways and metros (Q),5 on two
input prices, for labour (wL) and capital (wK), on an inverse density index
(ID) which is beyond the firm’s control and on the time, represented by year
dummies Dt6. Seat-kilometres is preferred as output over vehicle-kilometres,
because the size of vehicles, a substantial cost driver, is then included. Both
measures however represent a pure supply side consideration of output. In
contrast, passenger-kilometres, passengers or revenues also take demand into
account. Which output specification to use has been discussed intensively in the
literature (see e.g. De Borger et al, 2008, or De Borger et al, 2002, in recent
years). Management’s limited control over network and frequency planning,
and political considerations predominate today. The first competitive tenderings
carried out in the last decade have also mostly relied on gross contracts, leaving
the revenue risk to the public transport authority. Since this paper evaluates
management performance, the use of demand-oriented output measures would
punish management for requirements imposed by authorities. Hence, I follow
Farsi et al (2007), Farsi et al (2006), Margari et al (2007), Roy and Yvrande-Billon
(2007) and Piacenza (2006) and use the supply-oriented measure, seat-kilometres.
I note that demand-oriented measures are only available as aggregates in the data
5 Including both sitting and standing room.
6 Following Farsi et al (2005a) and Farsi and Filippini (2009).
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set and the cost of applying an aggregate for losing one output is too high and
would inadequately reflect the production technology of local public transport.
The year dummies capture technical progress and other unobserved year-specific
factors like changes in collective labour contracts. In contrast to a linear
time trend, year dummies assume that technical progress does not follow a
linear trend, which is an unrealistic assumption in many cases. The effects of
technical progress are assumed to be neutral, thus affecting all firms equally.
The most commonly applied flexible functional forms are the first-order flexible
Cobb-Douglas and the second-order flexible translog functions. Both allow the
variables to enter the estimation in logs in contrast to the quadratic function, which
makes them linear in parameters and less fragile to extreme data points. Increased
flexibility is usually preferred if the function remains estimable. Additionally, the
Cobb-Douglas function follows the same-returns-to-scale for all company sizes.
As economies of scale have proved to vary across output levels in central European
local public transport (see for example Farsi et al, 2007, and Walter, 2009), this
restriction should be avoided if possible. The translog function applied here
requires the approximation at a local point which is chosen to be the mean. The
median is less influenced by extreme outliers, whereas the mean reflects better the
actual position of all data points in the sample. Hence, all variables have been
divided by their mean following Farsi et al (2005b). After imposing the linear
homogeneity in input prices of degree one by dividing costs and the capital price
by the factor price for labour,7 the function can be written as
7 The other properties of the cost function, e.g. that all costs have to be strictly positive,
are verified in the data and the results sections.
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with α representing an intercept term, i = 1, 2, ..., 39 denoting the company and
t = 1, 2, ..., 10 denoting the year (for the year dummies, t = 1 (1997) is the
omitted year to avoid collinearity).
2.2 Econometric models
The focus here is on Stochastic Frontier models exploiting the panel structure of
our data. The first proposed models were the RE model (Pitt and Lee, 1981) and
the Fixed Effects model (Schmidt and Sickles, 1984). Since the amount of within
variation in the data is considerably low (at most 6 per cent within variation based
on overall variation for costs, outputs and the remaining factor price)8 and the
Fixed Effects model does not allow the incorporation of efficiency determinants
as heteroscedastic factors in the inefficiency function (Kumbhakar and Lovell,
2000), I do not consider this model in the following.9 This paper uses the RE
8 I calculated the within variation following Farsi et al (2005a). For further discussion
see also Farsi et al (2005b).
9 I will also discard a pooled model (Aigner et al, 1977, and Meeusen and van den Broeck,
1977) the so-called time-varying inefficiency model (see Kumbhakar, 1990, and Battese
and Coelli, 1992). The pooled model considers each observation as independent and
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model and its advancements. The Stochastic Frontier RE model as suggested
by Pitt and Lee (1981) interprets the panel data random effects as inefficiency.
Thus it does not account for firm heterogeneity and the inefficiency measure is
time-invariant. Moreover it assumes the explanatory variables to be uncorrelated
with the firm-specific effects. The details of the RE model estimated in this paper
are as follows:
ln C∗it = α+ x
′
itβ + vit + ui (3)
with x′itβ representing the parameters and the coefficients to be estimated from
Equation 2 and a normal-half-normal distribution of the stochastic term. The
time-variant, firm-specific error part vit ∼ iid N (0, σ2v) is independently
and identically distributed. ui represents the non-negative, time-invariant,
firm-specific inefficiency component. The usual assumption is that ui is also
independently and identically distributed, particularly when there is no evidence
about internal firm determinants. In this case, the outsourcing share and the
vehicle utilisation rate are suspected to be such factors. Including these factors
directly in the mean of the inefficiency function as Battese and Coelli (1995)
for environmental factors would raise the endogeneity discussion in applied
econometrics, although endogeneity does not appear to have the same effect
in SFA compared to the econometric estimation of average functions (Coelli,
2000). The approach followed here is to include the managerial determinants zi
as heteroscedastic variables in the inefficiency function, directly parameterising
the variance of the inefficiency. Formally, σ2ui = exp(γ
′zi) with γ′ including
does not allow for firm heterogeneity which is obviously not suitable to the data set.
The time-varying inefficiency models assume inefficiency to change systematically over
time, which is often not the case in reality, for example due to technological or economic
shocks.
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an estimated coefficient for an intercept.10 Such an approach is used by
Bhattacharyya et al (1995).11 zi are the degree of tramcar utilisation and the
outsourcing grade and should be “[...] variables related to characteristics of firm
management [...]” according to Hadri et al (2003b). These authors combine the
approach with the Battese and Coelli (1995) model, not followed here.
Introducing heteroscedasticity, the mean of ui then becomes to E(ui) =
σui
ϕ(0)
φ(0)
= 0.798 · σui (where ϕ is the probability density function of the
normal distribution, and φ is the cumulative distribution function of the normal
distribution) (Greene, 2007).
This approach is especially useful when the instrumental variable approach is not
suitable, for example due to data constraints. Two-stage estimations also have not
proven to be a generally accepted solution in such cases.
This RE model is estimated using the Maximum Likelihood Method. From
the composed error term, the inefficiencies are attained through the Jondrow
et al (1982) estimator which uses the conditional mean of the inefficiency term
E[ui|ui+vit]. Disadvantageous to the RE model, the inefficiency is time-invariant
and unobserved heterogeneity (likely to exist through the omittance of structural
variables for network shapes, altitude differences, environmental conditions etc.)
is not accounted for. An example in our case is the track gauge of tram systems
which differs from 1000 mm (Meterspur) to 1435 mm standard railway gauge
in Germany. 1000 mm lead to a constant disadvantage in service provision as
vehicles have to be smaller with smaller gauges.
The limitations of the RE model can be overcome with the TRE model proposed
by Greene (2004, 2005b). The details of the TRE model (also known as Random
10 I also estimated a RE model in which I allowed for heteroscedasticity in the stochastic
error term by letting the variance of it being dependent on the total volume of
seat-kilometres. However, this parameter has not proven to be significant.
11 See also Wang (2003), for an application of heteroscedastic variables to
financing-constrained investment using SFA.
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Constant model) estimated in this paper are as followed:
ln C∗it = α0 + αi + x
′
itβ + vit + uit (4)
with α = α0 +αi, α0 representing the firm-invariant intercept, αi ∼ iid N (0, σ2α)
and representing a firm-specific random intercept term to capture unobserved
heterogeneity, vit ∼ iid N (0, σ2v) and uit representing the non-negative,
time-variant, firm-specific inefficiency component. There are major differences
to the RE model. First, the TRE model has a random intercept being normally
distributed and capturing unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity. Second, the
inefficiency term is time-variant, allowing a much more realistic image of reality.
Third, it also assumes the explanatory variables to be uncorrelated with the
firm-specific effects, which may be an unrealistic assumption. However, as Farsi
et al (2005b) point out, at least time-variant efficiency measures are not very
sensitive to such a correlation because such correlations may be captured by the
coefficients of the cost function and do not affect residuals.
The conditional expectation of the inefficiency term E[uit|rit] with rit = αi +
uit + vit is calculated by Monte Carlo simulations (Greene, 2005a) in order to be
able to approximate the maximisation of the log-likelihood (Greene, 2005b). All
estimations for this model are done in one step. Apart from this, the model is very
similar to that proposed by Kumbhakar (1991), also applied by Kumbhakar and
Hjalmarsson (1995), who use a two-step estimation. The estimations presented in
the following again allow for heteroscedasticity in the inefficiency component, so
that σ2uit = exp(γ
′zit). The model is a special case of the Random Parameter
(RP) model. A RP model with not only random intercept, but also random
output parameter is the third model estimated in this paper. The randomness of
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output parameters is justified by the different technological systems summarised
in the rail-bound output category. A relatively slow overground tram in Dresden
definitely uses a different technology than a metro-similar light railway system
in Stuttgart, with lots of tunnels and a railroad embankment separated from
motorised individual transport (MIT). The heteroscedastic specification is the
same as for the TRE model. All the models estimated here assume that the
regressors are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables.12
3.0 Data and sector characteristics
The data set consists of an unbalanced panel of 254 observations of German
multi-output local public transport operators from 1997 until 2006. In total, 39
companies are included with a mean of 6.5 observations per company.13 The
physical data (output quantities, input quantities, etc.) was taken from the annual
statistics of the Association of German Transport Companies (Verband Deutscher
Verkehrsunternehmen (VDV), 2007, and preceding years). All monetary data was
extracted separately from annual reports. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics
for the data set. The monetary values are given in 2006 prices and inflated by the
German producer-price-index (Destatis, 2008). Total expenditures include: labor,
materials, other operating expenses, depreciation, interest on borrowed capital and
opportunity costs of capital. Cost of equity was not directly available from the data
set, and was calculated by taking the equity base for each company and year and
multiplying by the interest rates for corporate bonds at that time plus 2 per cent
risk premium (source for interest rates: Deutsche Bundesbank, 2007). Notably
12 For a more detailed and structured overview of panel data models see the publications
by Farsi et al, for example 2006.
13 The exact data structure is as follows: 1997: 22 observations, 1998 and 1999: 23 obs.,
2003: 24 obs., 2004 and 2006: 25 obs., 2000 and 2005: 26 obs., 2002: 29 obs. and
2001: 31 obs.
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this approach treats all companies equally. This may be justified by the public
ownership of the vast majority of Germany’s local public transport companies.
For the purpose of calculating factor prices, all cost items except labour costs are
included into capital and operating expenses. The shares for personnel costs as
well as capital and operating expenses show a relatively wide range from 0.20 to
0.66 and 0.34 to 0.80 respectively. The reason for this is outsourcing of services to
private partners, and particularly to privately organized subsidiaries, which often
employ significant amounts of transport labour. In the profit and loss accounts,
expenses for such employments are classified as expenses for purchased services.
The labour price is calculated as personnel costs divided by the number of
full-time-equivalents (FTE). The high range from 30 639 to 82 610 EUR is
related to regional wage differences, different age structures, outsourcing of
low-paid functions and different handling of pension accruals. The capital price
is calculated as residual costs (total costs minus personnel costs) divided by a
measure of capital quantity, the number of seats in buses and rail-bound cars (both
standing and sitting), following Farsi et al (2007). The number of seats was not
directly available from the VDV statistics, but approximated by the number of
seat-kilometres multiplied by the number of buses and cars divided by the number
of vehicle-kilometres. The underlying assumption is that the deployment of each
bus and railcar is uniformly distributed.
Assuming a common factor price for capital and operations for both kind of
outputs has two shortcomings. First, buses and rail-bound cars are treated equally
which may diverge from actual fixed and variable costs proportions. Second,
dividing the number of seats is a pure capital measure neglecting operational costs
like energy costs. However, absent more detailed information about the structure
of non-personnel costs, this is the best approach available.
The two outputs are seat-kilometres in buses and seat-kilometres in rail-bound
cars. Tram, light railway, and metro services are not split into different outputs
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because there is no clear definitional separation between these services, and
transitions are smooth.14 The inverse density index is defined as population in the
supplied area divided by the sum of bus line length and rail-bound track length.15
Turning to the heteroscedastic variables, the outsourcing share is defined as
purchased services (part of material costs) divided by total costs. According to
the German Commercial Code (Handelsgesetzbuch, HGB), purchases, e.g. for
energy or line services, are always considered material costs. The outsourcing
share has steadily increased from 0.09 in 1997 to 0.24 in 2006.16 Some companies
like Leipziger Verkehrsbetriebe (LVB) and Verkehrsgesellschaft Frankfurt (VGF)
have founded subsidiaries for bus and tram operations. The subsidiaries Leobus
and Leipziger Stadtverkehrsvertriebe (LSVB) and In-der-City-Bus (ICB) pay
lower wages that are not bound to civil service tariffs (see Walter et al, 2009,
also for a description of other strategies to react on local public transport
challenges).17 These subsidiary operations have been classified as purchased
services. This can also be seen in the correlation matrix in Table 2. The
capital price and the outsourcing share show a relatively high correlation (0.653)
because outsourcing shifts personnel costs into the capital block. With the capital
quantity remaining unchanged, a higher capital price without any real price
14 Tram services are usually characterised as pure overground services often with no
separate railroad embankment (from MIT). Examples include the major East German
cities like Dresden and Leipzig and the smaller West German cities. Light railway
services are typically characterised by higher average speeds and inner-city tunnels,
although their overall operations are similar to suburban tramways. In the 1970s,
many bigger West German cities invested in new infrastructure for light railways to
transform their existing tram services.
15 In a preliminary estimation I introduced the network length as alternative network
variable. This resulted in significance problems.
16 I am aware that, in an unbalanced panel, this increase can also be due to the data
structure, e.g. firms in early years with low outsourcing share and firms in late years
with high outsourcing share. However, a closer look on the data provides no evidence
to defend this hypothesis.
17 LVB achieved an outsourcing share of approximately 59 per cent in 2006 with 133 m
EUR of purchased services.
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increases results. This favours companies with higher outsourcing shares almost
automatically because the capital price is assumed to be exogenous in the cost
function specification. Hence, a higher capital price explains the variation of the
dependent variable and firms become more efficient.
This potential bias could be overcome with the introduction of a third factor
price for purchased services. Unfortunately no information is available for the
quantity of purchased services and the only price index would be a country-wide
one assigning a common factor price to all companies. Therefore, the results must
be interpreted with care. On the other hand, some concurrent tendencies in the
covered period may partially explain the high correlation, e.g. the capital price
includes purchased energy which showed a steady price increase in past years,
corresponding to an increasing outsourcing share. Furthermore this is a luxury
problem in comparison to the evaluation of technical efficiencies with production
or distance functions which very often neglect the presence of outsourcing.
The second heteroscedastic component is the vehicle utilisation rate of railcars
per day defined as vehicle-kilometres divided by the number of railcars and 365
days. The broad range from 47.33 for Jena in 199718 to 250.23 for Oberhausen
(STOAG) in 2005 indicates an improvement potential. The indicator is a measure
for the actual deployment time and for the average speed of these transport
systems.19 The low correlation coefficient between the utilisation rate and the
inverse density index (0.082) shows that a low utilisation rate is mostly unrelated
to congestion costs, and may be related instead to technological constraints and
18 47.33 relies on construction activities in Jena’s inner city in 1997, though many tram
services were replaced by bus services in that year. The second-lowest value is 72.98
with similar other values in the near range.
19 A similar vehicle utilisation rate could be calculated for bus operations. However, I
was not able to estimate a model in which all managerial variables, outsourcing share,
utilisation rate for railcars and vehicle utilisation rate for buses, were significant. This
may be due to the high dependency between outsourcing and bus utilisation. Many
firms employ small- and medium-sized bus companies from the surrounding areas that
can be called up on short notice as subcontractors.
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network characteristics which are supposed to be manageable, at least in the
long-term, especially for the municipal owners of local public transport firms.
The utilisation rate is furthermore also related to pure managerial factors like
maintenance time planning, vehicle scheduling, and to a certain degree peak
demand levels, which are outside the influence of the management. For these
reasons I use the utilisation rate as influenceable by management, acknowledging
that it could also be interpreted as exogenous (e.g. Piacenza, 2006).
The quality of services throughout Germany is generally considered quite high,
for instance, nearly all buses are low-floor buses for ease of entry and exit. No
consistent data basis for amenities such as the availability of air conditioning
exists. We can deduce from the data that speed matters, causing many potential
customers to choose private auto over local transport.
Although the data offers rich interpretation possibilities, there are some aspects
to consider. First, the asset valuation excludes subsidies from the public sector
(and hence distorts the opportunity cost of capital), and second, the land for stops
and the road bed is very often public property. Still, it is valuable to examine total
costs instead of variable costs, because the measure of efficiency can be biased
when looking only at parts of the total costs.
4.0 Results and interpretation
4.1 Regression results
Table 3 shows the regression results for the Random Effects (RE), for the True
Random Effects (TRE) and for the Random Parameter (RP) models.20 All
20 I have conducted the estimations with Limdep 9.0, using 1000 Halton draws for the
RP models after initial estimations using 50 Halton draws. Accuracy, as Train (2003)
points out, improves with an increasing number of Halton draws.
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first-order coefficients show the expected signs and are significant at the 1 per
cent level. The positive coefficients of output quantities and input prices verify
the non-decreasing-conditions of the cost function. All model parameters are in
logs, so the output coefficients can be interpreted as cost elasticities at the local
point of approximation, which is represented here by the mean. Across all models,
the cost elasticities for rail-bound services are substantially higher (between 0.493
and 0.500) than for bus services (between 0.387 and 0.430).21 An additional
seat-kilometre in a bus is hence approximately 25 per cent cheaper than in a tram,
light railway or metro. This may be reflected by the high fixed-cost proportion in
rail-bound services for the network and the cars which are mostly custom-made
for each single operator. These higher cost elasticities accompany the greater
comfort of rail-bound cars which are wider and quieter.
The capital price coefficient varies slightly around 0.47, closely representing
the 54 per cent share of capital and operational costs.22 The year dummies
are significantly negative from 2000 on, suggesting cost decreases because of
technological progress between 7 and 10 per cent in comparison to 1997. Further
cost decreases are observable until 2004 when cost savings between 18 and 23
per cent are established. Afterwards the level remains stable. This trend is
obviously not linear, leading my preliminary estimations with a linear time trend
to implausible results. Applying the approach by Saal et al (2007) and allowing for
technical change to vary with input and output levels did not produce significant
interaction terms between independent variables and time. The technological
progress may be represented by new buses and tramcars, e.g. East Germany’s old
Tatra tramcars have been replaced. The use of innovative information technology
21 The random output coefficients of the RP model hereby should be interpreted with
care, because, through the randomisation, there is no unique parameter to assess, only
a mean coefficient given.
22 Through imposing the linear homogeneity in input prices, a labour price coefficient of
0.53 follows.
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may also play a role. The coefficient of the inverse density index is significantly
positive indicating that higher population per network length leads to higher costs,
for example through reduced speed in urban areas, wait times at traffic lights,
higher wages and so on. The inverse density index can be seen as an efficiency
determinant outside the influence of management.
The coefficient of the second derivative of the cost function with respect to the
capital price is positive across all models, violating the concavity property of the
cost function (Cornes, 1992). According to Farsi et al (2005b) and Farsi and
Filippini (2009), this may originate from some constraints in the cost-minimising
strategy. For instance, competitive pressure may not be too strong and responses
to input prices are quite small. The reasons are that publicly owned local
transport firms are vulnerable to political concerns and the transfer of losses from
municipalities and affiliated energy companies.
I will next consider the model-specific heteroscedastic (z-) variables and the
random parameter. There are two heteroscedastic variables: outsourcing rate
and tramcar utilisation. These variables are not significant for the RE model. I
conducted likelihood-ratio tests in order to check the explanatory power of the
heteroscedastic variables. A model with tramcar utilisation rate (UR) as only
heteroscedastic variable is preferred to a basic model without heteroscedasticity
at a p-value of 1.4 per cent. Adding the outsourcing share does not lead to any
improvement and is rejected at a p-value of 99.1 per cent. The coefficient for
UR is negative suggesting that firms with high utilisation rates tend to have less
variability in efficiency; hence it appears to introduce planning reliability (see
Hadri et al, 2003a, on how to interpret heteroscedastic variables). For the TRE
and RP models, Wald tests have been used to check for the explanatory power of
the heteroscedastic components. The hypothesis that the coefficient of the tramcar
utilisation rate is equal to zero is rejected at a p-value of 0 per cent for both models.
The hypothesis that the coefficient of the outsourcing share is zero is rejected at
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p-values of 7.3 and 6.7 per cent respectively. The coefficient for both models is
also significantly negative, meaning that a higher outsourcing share leads to less
variability in efficiency. The delegation of services to third parties on short notice
appears to reduce risks and introduces stability in economic efficiency.
The random output parameters for the RP model are both significant, supporting
the use of this model. The variation for bus services appears to be even higher
than for tram, light railway and metro services. This can be related inter alia to
the deployment of standard and articulated buses.
4.2 Efficiencies
Table 4 shows statistics for the efficiency predictions. Efficiency predictions
which are given as levels in a range between greater than 0, and 1. The cost
savings potential is given by the difference from 1, that is, a global minimum
efficiency level of 0.650 means 35 per cent excess costs.
As expected, the mean for the RE model is much lower than for the TRE model,
because the latter treats all persistent inefficiency (as Kumbhakar, 1991, calls it)
as unobserved heterogeneity. From the descriptive statistics, the TRE model and
the RP model appear quite similar with a slightly higher standard deviation of
efficiency predictions for the RP model which allows more diversity. As Farsi and
Filippini (2009) point out, the true efficiencies should lie somewhere between the
RE model, which is supposed to underestimate efficiency, and the TRE model,
which is supposed to overestimate efficiency. The happy medium is around 0.9,
which is in a realistic albeit relatively high range. Restructuring and increased
cost efficiencies throughout Germany appear to be somehow successful. An
example for substantial efficiency differences between the two models is Bremer
Straßenbahnen AG (BSAG) with an efficiency prediction of 0.768 in the REmodel
and up to 0.957 for 2005 in the TRE model. The question remains whether this
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is related to unobserved heterogeneity (Bremen’s tram system does not rely on
a sophisticated infrastructure with tunnels etc.) or if it is persistent inefficiency.
Interestingly, in 2005 BSAG achieved a very low level of cost coverage of only
50.95 per cent.23
Around 0.9 was also the mean efficiency at the onset of incentive regulation for
German electricity and gas distribution companies (Agrell et al, 2008, taking a
best-of value of SFA and DEA values), which makes this number a reasonable
value for local network monopolies.
The inefficiencies refer to a savings potential of 1.40 to 4.43 bn EUR in 2006
prices, depending on the applied panel data model, for all 254 observations from
1997 until 2006. I note that for the TRE model at least 117 m EUR could have
been saved by the 25 firms considered in 2006.24
Table 5 shows the efficiency correlations with high consistencies. The rank
correlations shown in Table 6 show similar results. However, a comparison of
individual efficiency levels (mean over years) in Figure 1 shows that unobserved
heterogeneity plays an important role for some specific firms with differences up
to 20 per cent between the RE and TRE models.
A detailed look at the Kernel Density Estimate in Figure 2 also shows that the
distribution of efficiency predictions differs most between the RE and the other
two models. All curves suggest the efficiency to be negatively skewed which is the
usual assumption in Stochastic Cost Frontier models. The bimodal distribution in
the RE model however goes against the assumption of a half-normally distributed
inefficiency. As Farsi and Filippini (2009) point out, this may be explained by
“[...] cost differences that are not due to inefficiencies but to other external
factors.” In such a case, a RE model would not be appropriate for the given data.
23 Calculated as revenues (corrected from subsidies) divided by the total cost definition
applied here.
24 Savings potential is calculated as the sum of individual inefficiency scores multiplied
by individual total costs.
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I now look at the efficiency determinants under managerial control, the
outsourcing share and the vehicle utilisation rate. To check whether observations
with low values of these indicators really are less efficient, I split the sample
into values below, and values equal or above the median (for both indicators).
Mean efficiencies for these sub samples are given in Table 7. In all three models,
mean efficiencies for low outsourcing shares and low vehicle utilisation rates are
significantly lower. For the outsourcing share the differences in mean efficiencies
are somehow lower (between 0.007 and 0.019) resulting in p-values between
0.02 per cent and 1.98 per cent. These p-values are still low enough to reject
the hypothesis of equal distribution of efficiency values in the groups with low
respectively high outsourcing share. Outsourcing therefore appears to increase
efficiency. Still, this variable has to be interpreted carefully. Compared with the
vehicle utilisation rate, higher values do not necessarily mean better values, for
there could be an optimal outsourcing grade.
The results are even clearer for the vehicle utilisation rate. Differences in mean
efficiencies of the group with a low vehicle utilisation rate compared to the
group with a high vehicle utilisation rate account for approximately 0.03-0.07,
depending on the applied panel data model. These distribution differences are all
significant with very low p-values. Higher values of the railcar utilisation rate have
a positive influence on efficiency, as expected. This is related to higher average
speeds, better deployment times and lower maintenance and stop times and costs.
The effect on efficiency also appears to be stronger than for the outsourcing share.
5.0 Conclusions
In this paper, I estimated state-of-the-art models of Stochastic Frontier Analysis
incorporating unobserved heterogeneity and allowing for heteroscedasticity in the
21
inefficiency function. Incorporating unobserved heterogeneity is important when
the data set omits environmental/structural variables which are likely to influence
the production process. This is an important application, although I also showed
that observed heterogeneity plays a significant role as well. The inverse density
index defined as population living in the network area has a cost-increasing
influence.
Two efficiency determinants under managerial control were included as
heteroscedastic variables in the inefficiency function. I conducted tests on the
influence of these managerial determinants on mean efficiencies of groups with
high vs. low outsourcing and high vs. low vehicle utilisation. All Kruskal-Wallis
tests indicated that the high values show a higher efficiency distribution. This
implies great potential for improvements. Optimisation of outsourcing should
be in focus for businessmen emphasised for firms that have neglected it in the
past. The options include establishing subsidiaries or cooperating with small-
and medium-sized firms. The vast differences in the vehicle utilisation rate
for railcars (shown in the descriptive data statistics) are somewhat surprising.
Improvement options can be related to enhancing speed through infrastructure
measures (separate rail embankments, prioritisation at traffic lights, tunnels in
inner-city areas, new tracks, express trains similar to those in Karlsruhe, etc.).
Furthermore maintenance times could be reduced and procurement optimised.
In an international context, the analysis shows how cost efficiency and hence
economic success of local public transport relates to the utilisation degree
of vehicles. For example, local public transport must achieve intermodally
competitive average speeds, supported by adequate transport planning and policy
measures.
Considering Germany’s low mean level of cost coverage with 73.8 per cent
(Verband Deutscher Verkehrsunternehmen, 2008), the problem is likely to extend
beyond the cost side. I found mean efficiencies roughly about 0.9, meaning
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that full efficiency would also imply a negative level of cost coverage. Some
past improvements have often been attributed to wage reductions. The revenue
side should bear further optimisation potential and should be analysed in the
future. These results impact corporate strategies and point to the need for a
comprehensive, national regulation.
References
Agrell P, Bogetoft P, Cullmann A, Hirschhausen Cv, Neumann A,
Walter M (2008) Projekt GERNER IV Ergebnisdokumentation:
Bestimmung der Effizienzwerte Verteilernetzbetreiber Gas. URL:
http://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/media/archive/14563.pdf,
retrieved 10 July 2009
Aigner D, Lovell CAK, Schmidt P (1977) Formulation and estimation of
stochastic frontier production function models. Journal of Econometrics
6(1):21–37
Battese GE, Coelli TJ (1992) Frontier production functions, technical efficiency
and panel data: With application to paddy farmers in India. Journal of
Productivity Analysis 3(1-2):153–169
Battese GE, Coelli TJ (1995) A model for technical efficiency effects
in a stochastic frontier production for panel data. Empirical Economics
20(2):325–332
Berechman J (1993) Public Transit Economics and Deregulation Policy.
North-Holland, Amsterdam
23
Bhattacharyya A, Kumbhakar SC, Bhattacharyya A (1995) Ownership structure
and cost efficiency: A study of publicly owned passenger-bus transportation
companies in India. Journal of Productivity Analysis 6(1):47–61
Coelli T (2000) On the econometric estimation of the distance function
representation of a production technology, Université catholique de Louvain,
Center for Operations Research and Econometrics, CORE Discussion Papers
00/42 [sic!]
Coelli TJ, Rao DSP, O’Donnell CJ, Battese GE (2005) An Introduction to
Efficiency and Productivity Analysis, 2nd edn. Springer, New York
Cornes R (1992) Duality and Modern Economics. Cambridge University Press
De Borger B, Kerstens K, Costa A (2002) Public transit performance: what does
one learn from frontier studies? Transport Reviews 22(1):1–38
De Borger B, Kerstens K, Staat M (2008) Transit costs and cost efficiency:
Bootstrapping non-parametric frontiers. Research in Transportation Economics
23(1):53–64
Destatis (2008) Preise und Preisindizes für gewerbliche Produkte (Erzeugerpreise)
Juni 2008. Statistisches Bundesamt Fachserie 17 Reihe 2. Wiesbaden
Deutsche Bundesbank (2007) Monatsbericht August 2007. URL: http:
//www.bundesbank.de/download/volkswirtschaft/monatsberichte/
2007/200708mb_bbk.pdf, retrieved 05 June 2009
Farsi M, Filippini M (2009) An analysis of cost efficiency in Swiss multi-utilities.
Energy Economics 31(2):306–315
24
Farsi M, Filippini M, Greene W (2005a) Efficiency measurement in network
industries: Application to the Swiss railway companies. Journal of Regulatory
Economics 28(1):69–90
Farsi M, Filippini M, Kuenzle M (2005b) Unobserved heterogeneity in stochastic
cost frontier models: An application to Swiss nursing homes. Applied
Economics 37(18):2127–2141
Farsi M, Filippini M, Kuenzle M (2006) Cost efficiency in regional bus
companies: An application of alternative stochastic frontier models. Journal
of Transport Economics and Policy 40(1):95–118
Farsi M, Fetz A, Filippini M (2007) Economies of scale and scope in local public
transportation. Journal of Transport Economics and Policy 41(3):345–361
Greene W (2004) Distinguishing between heterogeneity and inefficiency:
Stochastic frontier analysis of the World Health Organizations panel data on
national health care systems. Health Economics 13(10):959–980
Greene W (2005a) Fixed and random effects in stochastic frontier models. Journal
of Productivity Analysis 23(1):7–32
Greene W (2005b) Reconsidering heterogeneity in panel data estimators of the
stochastic frontier model. Journal of Econometrics 126(2):269–303
Greene WH (2007) Limdep Version 9.0 Reference Guide. Econometric Software
[sic!], Plainview
Greene WH (2008) The econometric approach to efficiency analysis. In: Fried
HO, Lovell CK, Schmidt SS (eds) The Measurement of Productive Efficiency
and Productive Growth, Oxford University Press, pp 92–250 [sic!]
25
Hadri K, Guermat C, Whittaker J (2003a) Estimating farm efficiency in the
presence of double heteroscedasticity using panel data. Journal of Applied
Economics VI(2):255–268
Hadri K, Guermat C, Whittaker J (2003b) Estimation of technical inefficiency
effects using panel data and doubly heteroscedastic stochastic production
frontiers. Empirical Economics 28(1):203–222
Jondrow J, Lovell CAK, Materov IS, Schmidt P (1982) On the estimation of
technical inefficiency in the stochastic frontier production model. Journal of
Econometrics 19(2-3):233–238
Kumbhakar SC (1990) Production frontiers, panel data and time-varying technical
inefficiency. Journal of Econometrics 46(1-2):201–211
Kumbhakar SC (1991) Estimation of technical inefficiency in panel data models
with firm- and time-specific effects. Economics Letters 36(1):43–48
Kumbhakar SC, Hjalmarsson L (1995) Labour-use efficiency in Swedish social
insurance offices. Journal of Applied Econometrics 10(1):33–47
Kumbhakar SC, Lovell CAK (2000) Stochastic Frontier Analysis. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge
Margari BB, Erbetta F, Petraglia C, Piacenza M (2007) Regulatory and
environmental effects on public transit efficiency: a mixed DEA-SFA approach.
Journal of Regulatory Economics 32(2):131–151
Meeusen W, van den Broeck J (1977) Efficiency estimation from Cobb-Douglas
production functions with composed error. International Economic Review
18(2):435–444
26
Nieswand M, Hess B, Hirschhausen Cv (2008) Cost efficiency and market
structure in German public bus transport, Dresden University of Technology,
Chair of Energy Economics and Public Sector Management, Working Paper
Efficiency Analysis 09
Piacenza M (2006) Regulatory contracts and cost efficiency: Stochastic frontier
evidence from the Italian local public transport. Journal of Productivity
Analysis 25(3):257–277
Pitt MM, Lee LF (1981) The measurement and sources of technical inefficiency in
Indonesian weaving industry. Journal of Development Economics 9(1):43–64
Roy W, Yvrande-Billon A (2007) Ownership, contractual practices and technical
efficiency: The case of urban public transport in France. Journal of Transport
Economics and Policy 41(2):257–282
Saal DS, Parker D, Weyman-Jones T (2007) Determining the contribution of
technical change, efficiency change and scale change to productivity growth
in the privatized English and Welsh water and sewerage industry: 1985-2000.
Journal of Productivity Analysis 28(1-2):127–139
Samuelson P (1983) Foundations of Economic Analysis, enlarged edn. Harvard
University Press
Schmidt P, Sickles RE (1984) Production frontiers and panel data. Journal of
Business & Economic Statistics 2(4):367–374
Train KE (2003) Discrete Choice Methods with Simulation. Cambridge
University Press
Verband Deutscher Verkehrsunternehmen (2007) VDV Statistik 2006. Köln
27
Verband Deutscher Verkehrsunternehmen (2008) VDV Statistik 2007. Köln
Viton PA (1992) Consolidations of scale and scope in urban transit. Regional
Science and Urban Economics 22(1):25–49
Viton PA (1993) How big should transit be? Evidence on the benefits of
reorganization from the San Francisco Bay Area. Transportation 20(1):35–57
Walter M (2009) Economies of scale and scope in urban public transport, Dresden
University of Technology, Chair of Energy Economics and Public Sector
Management, Working Paper Efficiency Analysis 19
Walter M, Haunerland F, Moll R (2009) Heavily regulated but promising
prospects: Entry in the German express coach market, Dresden University
of Technology, Chair of Energy Economics and Public Sector Management,
Working Paper Transport Economics 16
Wang HJ (2003) A Stochastic Frontier Analysis of financing constraints on
investment: The case of financial liberalization in Taiwan. Journal of Business
& Economic Statistics 21(3):406–419
Figure 1: Comparison of efficiency predictions
Source: Own calculation
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Suma Min. Mean Median Max. Std. Dev.
Total cost (C) 2822.67 11.70 111.14 70.13 363.23 86.82
[m EUR]
Share personnel costs 0.19 0.46 0.46 0.62 0.08
Share capital costs 0.38 0.54 0.54 0.81 0.08
Labour Price (wL) 30 639 49 636 50 409 82 610 8714
[EUR/FTE]
Capital Price (wK) 934 1917 1679 5064 766
[EUR/seat]
Output in m seat-kilometres
Bus (Y ) 17 122 4 656 459 2303 503
Rail-bound (Q) 27 482 50 1018 644 4800 974
Inverse density 138 862 787 2958 458
index (ID)b
Outsourcing share 0.00 0.16 0.12 0.59 0.19
(OUT )c,d
Railcar utilisation 47.33 135.66 128.11 250.23 39.27
rate (UR)e,d
Vehicles
Bus 3650 2 146 103 470 106
Rail-bound 2855 6 124 85 513 106
aSum values for 2006 bInhabitants per km network length cBased on total costs
dCalculated over 254 observations (note that the RE model uses
group means in z-variables) eVehicle-km per day and vehicle
Source: Own calculation
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Table 2: Data correlations
Y Q wL wK ID OUT UR
C 0.837 0.920 0.242 0.218 0.227 0.208 0.357
Y 0.707 0.253 0.007 0.060 0.131 0.342
Q 0.105 0.061 0.239 0.110 0.335
wL 0.201 0.083 0.268 0.226
wK 0.154 0.663 0.501
ID -0.123 0.082
OUT 0.391
Source: Own calculation
Figure 2: Kernel density of efficiency predictions
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Table 3: Regression results
Model RE TRE RP
Parameter Estimate Estimate Estimate
α −.105∗∗ .036 .013
(.044) (.022) (.020)
σα — .095∗∗∗ .096∗∗∗
— (.004) (.004)
βY .430∗∗∗ .406∗∗∗ .387∗∗∗
(.053) (.008) (.007)
σβY — — .103∗∗∗
— — (.005)
βQ .494∗∗∗ .500∗∗∗ .493∗∗∗
(.026) (.007) (.006)
σβQ — — .030∗∗∗
— — (.003)
βK .464∗∗∗ .467∗∗∗ .473∗∗∗
(.040) (.011) (.010)
βY Y .145∗∗ .165∗∗∗ .159∗∗∗
(.071) (.007) (.006)
βQQ .151∗∗∗ .150∗∗∗ .162∗∗∗
(.038) (.008) (.007)
βKK .381∗ .276∗∗∗ .252∗∗∗
(.230) (.047) (.044)
βY Q −.098∗∗ −.149∗∗∗ −.152∗∗∗
(.049) (.008) (.008)
βY K .061 .019 .024
(.059) (.019) (.018)
βQK −.058 −.058∗∗∗ −.059∗∗∗
(.040) (.018) (.017)
β1998 −.058 −.033 −.032
β1999 −.057 −.041 −.041
β2000 −.098∗∗ −.074∗∗ −.073∗∗∗
β2001 −.126∗∗∗ −.091∗∗∗ −.091∗∗∗
β2002 −.160∗∗∗ −.121∗∗∗ −.122∗∗∗
β2003 −.212∗∗∗ −.162∗∗∗ −.161∗∗∗
β2004 −.235∗∗∗ −.186∗∗∗ −.186∗∗∗
β2005 −.236∗∗∗ −.182∗∗∗ −.183∗∗∗
β2006 −.237∗∗∗ −.184∗∗∗ −.185∗∗∗
βID .064∗∗ .047∗∗∗ .050∗∗∗
(.029) (.008) (.008)
γ0 — 6.072∗∗∗ 6.134∗∗∗
— (1.616) (1.563)
γOUT — −.260∗ −.252∗
— (.145) (.134)
γUR −2.744 −6.749∗∗∗ −6.722∗∗∗
(2.331) (2.037) (1.970)
σu .714 .035 .036
λ = σu/σv 12.948 .799 .888∗∗∗significant at 1 per cent, ∗∗significant at 5 per cent,
∗significant at 10 per cent; standard errors in parentheses
(omitted for year dummies for reasons of space)
Source: Own calculation
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Table 4: Descriptive efficiencies
Model RE TRE RP
Minimum 0.650 0.855 0.844
Mean 0.862 0.952 0.949
Median 0.866 0.960 0.954
Maximum 0.990 0.993 0.993
Standard deviation 0.090 0.031 0.032
N 39 254 254
Source: Own calculation
Table 5: Efficiency correlations
Model RE TRE RP
RE 100.00% 95.58% 96.11%
TRE 100.00% 98.52%[98.75%]
RP 100.00%
Based on average firm values (39 obs.)
In brackets based on all observations
Source: Own calculation
Table 6: Rank correlations
Model RE TRE RP
RE 100.00% 94.99% 95.50%
TRE - 100.00% 97.70%[98.77%]
RP - - 100.00%
Based on average firm values (39 obs.)
In brackets based on all observations
Source: Own calculation
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Table 7: Efficiency comparisons and Kruskal-Wallis tests
Model RE TRE RP
Outsourcing (OUT )
Mean efficiency for low OUT 0.837 0.948 0.944
Mean efficiency for high OUT 0.855 0.955 0.953
χ21-value 5.432 9.712 14.353
Probability 1.98% 0.18% 0.02%
Vehicle utilisation (UR)
Mean efficiency for low UR 0.811 0.936 0.934
Mean efficiency for high UR 0.881 0.967 0.963
χ21-value 34.979 63.114 52.008
Probability 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
Low and high groups with 127 obs. each, split at the median of the
efficiency determinant
Source: Own calculation
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